2024: Everything is ready for war escalation. 2025: Reopening of the “northern front” against Ukraine

In 2024, Belarus and Russia significantly deepened their military cooperation aimed at joint preparation for a potential conflict with Ukraine and deterring NATO from military intervention in it. Primarily, these actions included intensified interaction between the Armed Forces (AF) in nuclear planning and the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) deployed by the Kremlin on Belarusian territory. The Armed Forces of Belarus continued to prepare for entry into the war, actively adopting the experience of the conflict with Ukraine from their Russian counterparts. The Lukashenka regime continued to improve the legal mechanisms for transitioning the state from peacetime to wartime. A new security guarantees treaty within the Union State further entrenched Belarus in Russia’s geopolitical sphere of influence. Additionally, it created legal obligations for Minsk to join the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and support confrontation with NATO. Moscow and Minsk’s nuclear escalation threats were aimed at deterring NATO from military intervention in the conflict on Ukraine’s side.

Since the beginning of the year, the Belarusian military-political leadership began preparing the army and security forces for the inevitability of a large-scale escalation of the conflict between Russia/Belarus and Ukraine/the West. Accusing the United States and NATO of plans to redraw territorial borders in Europe and attack Russia and Belarus, Lukashenka, following the Kremlin, called for abandoning illusions about a diplomatic resolution of the “Russia-West” conflict. He also advocated for preemptive military actions against potential aggressors to avoid a global defeat. Belarusian military intelligence, the GRU, confirmed the leadership’s concerns: the territories of Poland and the Baltic states are turning into a NATO military staging ground for conducting operations against Russia and Belarus; meanwhile, the US and its allies continue a proxy war in Ukraine, which threatens to escalate into a large-scale conflict between nuclear powers involving Belarus.

The ideological and legal basis for Belarus’s future participation in conflicts on Russia’s side was laid by the new Military Doctrine (MD), adopted at the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. It establishes Western countries and NATO as the country’s main adversaries and declares Minsk’s obligations to participate in military conflicts involving members of the Union State and CSTO. The document essentially legitimizes the future involvement of the Belarusian army in the Russian-Ukrainian war as part of the Regional Grouping of Forces (RGF) of Belarus and Russia. The doctrine declares that continued Western obstruction of a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine creates prerequisites for its escalation and the gradual expansion of participants, including Poland and other NATO countries.

The MD also provided legal grounds for the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Formally, this is seen as an essential component of preventive deterrence against potential aggressors from initiating armed aggression—and as a forced reaction to the Western guarantors’ failure to comply with the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Belarus’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, Lukashenka explained this decision differently: in military terms, TNW is offensive weaponry.

This was confirmed by a series of exercises of non-strategic nuclear forces conducted by Moscow and Minsk from May to September. The composition of the participants suggested that the Kremlin conducted strategic command-staff maneuvers (SCSM) involving the Southern, Leningrad, and Moscow military districts, the Aerospace Forces, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, and the RGF of Belarus and Russia. SCSMs of such scale likely imply planning and executing a first nuclear strike during a front-line offensive operation. Such an attack fits within the framework of a strategic operation in the European theater of military actions—in this case, against Ukraine and NATO member states on the “eastern flank.” One of the scenario elements was the seizure of Vilnius with the preemptive use of nuclear weapons to instill fear in the enemy and force de-escalation of military actions on Russian terms.

Western intelligence continues to view the deployment and exercises involving TNW on Belarusian territory as a political signal from the Kremlin aimed at unnerving NATO countries. However, the real nature and deployment procedures directly near carriers, rather than at Central Storage Bases (CSBs), indicate practical preparation by Minsk and Moscow for its operational use against Ukraine and/or NATO’s “eastern flank.”

The Kremlin continues nuclear blackmail of Europe, flaunting threats of nuclear strikes on Western countries and turning Belarusian territory into a source of nuclear threats. Moscow reinforces its rhetoric with practical actions: preparing for new deliveries of tactical nuclear weapon carriers to Belarus—Iskander-M missile systems and deploying the Oreshnik missile system (MS) capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

These decisions are justified by the Belarusian side as:

• a response to the deployment of similar American intermediate-range weapons in Europe,
• the militarization of the region,
• the conflict between Russia and Ukraine,
• an information campaign “launched against Belarus to discredit the authorities and the country’s leadership, ensuring conditions for conflicts to arise or be provoked.”

At the same time, Lukashenka claims that, as in the case of Russian TNW, targets for using the Oreshnik will be determined by the Belarusian military-political leadership, with Russian specialists only assisting in its operation. In reality, this means the deployment of new Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) bases on Belarusian territory.

From Moscow’s perspective, the sole rationale for deploying TNW and Oreshnik in Belarus is to deter NATO from entering the war on Ukraine’s side in the event of further conflict escalation. However, under the most apocalyptic scenario (if the Kremlin decides to use this weapon against European targets), Belarus, not Russian territory, becomes the target of retaliatory strikes. In this case, hypothetical TNW use by the Kremlin from Belarusian territory allows Russia to “shield” itself with Belarus from a counterstrike by the US/NATO. Thus, Belarus becomes the first natural target for such a response. This choice of target is further facilitated by Lukashenka attributing to himself participation in decision-making about using this weapon and selecting strike targets. These statements do not reflect reality: the Kremlin plays the leading role in decision-making, TNW control, and Oreshnik MS, while Belarus serves as an executor.

Despite peace-oriented rhetoric, increasing evidence suggests that the regime continues preparations for potential participation in military actions against Ukraine. For this purpose, brigades and battalion tactical groups (BTGs) of the Belarusian Armed Forces, totaling 20 units, have been designated for the Ukrainian direction. This is ten times more than currently deployed on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and three to four times more than at the start of the war on February 24, 2022. Other security structures (the State Border Committee, Internal Troops) are also creating new special forces units and maneuver groups capable of acting as “light” BTGs, aided by instructors from the Wagner PMC. These units are intended for tasks within Belarus and beyond, including the border strip.

Additionally, the Belarusian army is transitioning to combat training programs that consider the experience of Russian Armed Forces in the war against Ukraine. This process is facilitated by training centers established in Belarus and Russia. The key elements of the joint training program include offensive and assault operations in urbanized areas. Over a hundred Belarusian military instructors have already undergone training at these centers and are now sharing their expertise within the Belarusian army.

The Belarusian leadership is amending legislation to improve the transition of state bodies and other organizations from peacetime to wartime operations. These innovations are driven by the escalation of the military-political situation due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and preparations for Belarus’s potential entry into the war on Russia’s side.

Moreover, the regime suspended Belarus’s participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). On one hand, this will allow withholding information from Western countries about the composition of the Belarusian and Russian forces. On the other, it will conceal from Western inspectors preparations for new offensive actions by the armed forces of Belarus and Russia.

By the end of the year, Belarus’s cementation in Russia’s geopolitical influence sphere had reached alarming proportions. In December, at the Supreme State Council of the Union State, Lukashenka and Putin signed the Security Concept and the Security Guarantees Treaty. Both documents impose obligations on Minsk to participate in military conflicts on Russia’s side. The Security Guarantees Treaty envisages mutual military support in case of threats to the sovereignty, independence, constitutional order, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the Union State’s external borders from third states, international organizations, terrorist groups, or extremists. Possible responses to these threats include deploying Russian military bases and other facilities on Belarusian territory, using military force, including Russian TNW.

The condition for such use of Russian nuclear weapons is a nuclear attack or the use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as aggression using conventional weapons. This aggression must pose a critical threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Russia or Belarus. This condition is almost identical to Russia’s new nuclear doctrine. However, criteria for criticality are not defined in any document.

Thus, the document provides the sought-after security guarantees for Belarus in the context of preparing the Union State for the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and confrontation with NATO. It includes provisions similar to those of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and North Korea. Given that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are conducting operations in the Kursk region and on occupied Ukrainian territories officially “included” by Russia, the treaty creates all formal grounds for the direct involvement and participation of the Belarusian army in the war against Ukraine. Such escalation may include a new invasion from Belarusian territory with possible Belarusian army involvement and the potential use of TNW. The threat of reopening the northern front should, at a minimum, stretch Ukrainian Armed Forces reserves, while a nuclear ultimatum may prevent further Ukrainian advances into Russia and hinder the transfer of hostilities to Belarusian territory.

In this context, Minsk confirmed the joint strategic exercise of the Regional Grouping of Forces “West” with the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus in 2025. The exercise is declared the largest in RGF history. By analogy with the “Union Resolve-2022” joint exercise and the sudden check of RGF Response Forces in February 2022, the “West-2025” exercise may serve as a cover for the concentration of Russian troops on Belarusian territory in preparation for a new attack on Ukraine. At the same time, Minsk and Moscow’s bilateral legal framework improvements aim to create legal grounds for using the RGF (including Belarusian forces) in the conflict with Ukraine. Minsk and Moscow anticipate that the presence of TNW and the Oreshnik MS in Belarus, along with changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, should deter Ukraine and the West from transferring hostilities to Belarusian territory.

Forecasts:

• Ratification of the Security Guarantees Treaty within the Union State will create legal grounds for the Belarusian Armed Forces to enter the war as part of the Regional Grouping of Forces against Ukraine.
• Concentration of the RGF for a renewed attack from Belarusian territory on Ukraine will occur under the guise of preparation and conduct of the joint strategic exercise “West-2025” and testing of non-strategic nuclear forces.
• To consolidate Belarus within its sphere of influence, Russia will begin establishing its military bases on Belarusian territory.
• In the event of Western coalition military intervention in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the risk of Russia using TNW from Belarusian territory against targets in Ukraine and NATO’s “eastern flank” countries will increase.