All trends
Minsk toughens rhetoric as the West declines to engage in dialogue
Minsk wants the Russian-Ukrainian war to end
Minsk will continue to try to distance itself from Russia’s war against Ukraine
Minsk tries to remain relevant to regional security geopolitics
Minsk tries to return to “security arbitrage”
Minsk wants out of this war
Aggression against Ukraine: the situation for Minsk is becoming more complicated
No signs of Belarus preparing for war
Minsk tries to isolate itself from the war against Ukraine
Minsk continues to balance on the brink of war and peace
Minsk will shield the Kremlin from the West but has no interest in fighting in Ukraine
The Belarusian regime buys a ticket aboard the “Titanic”
Minsk sends conflicting signals about the expanding Russian military presence
Belarusian-Ukrainian relations in free fall
Belarusian-Ukrainian relations are steadily deteriorating
Minsk-Kyiv: “Cold War” replaces “Cold Peace”
Minsk demonstrates its inability to competently evaluate and respond to external challenges
Minsk awaits the West’s response to the Kremlin’s ultimatum
Minsk tries to get off the Russian escalation train
A new wave of repression before the constitutional referendum
Minsk abandons its longstanding positioning as “a regional security donor”
“Pre-war” rhetoric as a tool of Minsk’s pressure on the EU
The West has begun to speak a language that Minsk understands
The Kremlin has its own agenda regarding the confrontation between the Belarusian regime and the West
The Military Doctrine of the “Union State” and the Migration Crisis
Minsk once again invokes the “Polish threat.”
Lukashenka undermines COVID control measures as the leadership of the security forces is strengthened ahead of the referendum
Afghanistan is not a Belarusian Problem
The migration crisis escalates on both sides of the border
The Belarusian regime opens a Ukrainian Front
Mixed Messaging from Minsk
The field of political decisions is sharply narrowing
Minsk’s strategic autonomy diminishes
The possibility of a Russian military base in Belarus returns to the agenda
The Belarusian regime seeks to diversify conflict with the West
Zapad [West] -2021 becomes Russian
The Belarusian regime seeks to preserve critical communication channels with the West
Security issues
Minsk toughens rhetoric as the West declines to engage in dialogue
May 9 – May 15
Minsk wants the Russian-Ukrainian war to end
May 2 – May 8
Minsk will continue to try to distance itself from Russia’s war against Ukraine
April 25 – May 1
Minsk tries to remain relevant to regional security geopolitics
April 18 – April 24
Minsk tries to return to “security arbitrage”
April 11 – April 17
Minsk wants out of this war
April 4 – April 10
Aggression against Ukraine: the situation for Minsk is becoming more complicated
March 28 – April 3
No signs of Belarus preparing for war
March 21 – March 27
Minsk tries to isolate itself from the war against Ukraine
March 14 – March 20
Minsk continues to balance on the brink of war and peace
March 7 – March 13
Minsk will shield the Kremlin from the West but has no interest in fighting in Ukraine
February 28 – March 6
The Belarusian regime buys a ticket aboard the “Titanic”
February 21 – February 27
Minsk sends conflicting signals about the expanding Russian military presence
February 14 – February 20
Belarusian-Ukrainian relations in free fall
February 7 – February 13
Belarusian-Ukrainian relations are steadily deteriorating
January 31 – February 6
Minsk-Kyiv: “Cold War” replaces “Cold Peace”
January 17 – January 23
Minsk demonstrates its inability to competently evaluate and respond to external challenges
January 10 – January 16
Minsk awaits the West’s response to the Kremlin’s ultimatum
December 20 – December 26
Minsk tries to get off the Russian escalation train
December 13 – December 19
A new wave of repression before the constitutional referendum
December 6 – December 12
Minsk abandons its longstanding positioning as “a regional security donor”
November 29 – December 5
“Pre-war” rhetoric as a tool of Minsk’s pressure on the EU
November 22 – November 28
The West has begun to speak a language that Minsk understands
November 15 – November 21
The Kremlin has its own agenda regarding the confrontation between the Belarusian regime and the West
November 8 – November 14
The Military Doctrine of the “Union State” and the Migration Crisis
November 1 – November 7
Minsk once again invokes the “Polish threat.”
October 25 – October 31
Lukashenka undermines COVID control measures as the leadership of the security forces is strengthened ahead of the referendum
October 18 – October 24
Afghanistan is not a Belarusian Problem
October 11 – October 17
The migration crisis escalates on both sides of the border
October 4 – October 10
The Belarusian regime opens a Ukrainian Front
September 27 – October 3
Mixed Messaging from Minsk
September 20 – September 26
The field of political decisions is sharply narrowing
September 13 – September 19
Minsk’s strategic autonomy diminishes
September 6 – September 12
The possibility of a Russian military base in Belarus returns to the agenda
August 30 – September 5
The Belarusian regime seeks to diversify conflict with the West
August 23 – August 29
Zapad [West] -2021 becomes Russian
August 16 – August 22
The Belarusian regime seeks to preserve critical communication channels with the West
August 9 – August 15