The Kremlin Prepares a Response to the Kursk Raid by Ukrainian Forces

In light of recent successes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) in the Kursk region, with the potential for military actions to extend into other border areas of Russia (and even Belarus), Minsk and Moscow are planning new military exercises on Belarusian territory. The threat of reopening the northern front is intended to stretch UAF reserves, while a nuclear ultimatum is aimed at preventing further advancement of Ukrainian troops into Russia and stopping the spread of military actions onto Belarusian soil.

The UAF already controls more than 1,250 square kilometers of enemy territory and 92 settlements in the Kursk region. This is the result of an operation to create a buffer zone to protect border areas from Russian strikes. Additionally, the UAF is continually probing Russian defenses in the Belgorod and Bryansk regions.

The Kremlin has tasked its military command with driving the UAF out of the Kursk region by October 1. To achieve this, the Ministry of Defense has established a Coordinating Council on Military Security Issues for the border territories of the Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk regions, as well as the “Belgorod,” “Kursk,” and “Bryansk” troop groups. However, within the Russian military, there is skepticism about Putin’s deadline for liberating these territories, with some estimating that the operation to regain control of these regions could take up to six months.

Amid this backdrop, there is speculation about the possible direct involvement of Belarus in the conflict with Ukraine to assist Russia. These speculations are fueled by statements from Lukashenka himself.

It is possible that Minsk and Moscow are planning to reopen the “northern front” against Ukraine from Belarusian territory. The Kremlin may also issue a “nuclear ultimatum” if it fails to push the UAF out of Russia by the deadlines. As a result, Minsk and Moscow may plan joint military exercises of the Regional Grouping of Forces (RGF) on Belarusian territory as part of the ongoing third stage of testing non-strategic nuclear forces.

These exercises could involve the transfer and deployment of Russian components, including tactical nuclear weapons carriers such as Iskander missile systems, MiG-31K, Su-34, and Su-24M aircraft. Belarus would contribute Su-25M aircraft, Iskander missile systems, and Polonez-M multiple rocket launchers.

To protect the troop grouping, a layered air defense system, including S-400 “Triumf,” Tor, and Pantsir systems, will be deployed. These systems will cover strike complexes with tactical nuclear weapons, as well as airbases hosting aviation units.

In this context, it is noteworthy that during exercises at the Russian Ashuluk training ground, Belarusian air defense units focused on maneuvering combat actions with S-300 systems. At the same time, Tor-M2K missile systems, which were firing while on the move for the first time, provided cover for the maneuvering S-300 missile divisions. Additionally, Su-30SM pilots conducted their first launches of short- and medium-range missiles. The nature of these tasks clearly indicates the practice of covering maneuvering missile groups.

Moreover, the arrival of a Russian ground contingent of 3-5 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) is expected. The total strength of the Russian grouping is anticipated to be 5-6 thousand personnel. The number is dictated by the requirement that a single missile group with tactical nuclear weapons must have at least two rings of security, a layered air defense system, and logistical support units.

Under this scenario, it is expected that Russian troops and equipment will begin arriving in Belarus by mid-to-late September. It is possible that this deployment will only be the first stage in increasing the Russian military presence in Belarus.

However, it cannot be ruled out that the presence of this contingent may also be part of an agreement on mutual security guarantees between Minsk and Moscow, scheduled to be signed in the fall.

Minsk, like the Kremlin, fears that Kyiv could replicate the success of the Kursk raid on the Belarusian front. This could lead not only to a deep internal political crisis and the collapse of Lukashenko’s regime but also to Belarus exiting the war.

For Russia, reopening the northern front from Belarusian territory is intended to create another threatened direction, thereby stretching and diverting UAF reserves.

In the event of further successful actions by the UAF, the Kremlin might issue a “nuclear ultimatum”—a threat to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine from Belarusian territory. In this case, Lukashenka’s arguments that using nuclear weapons would cause Minsk and Moscow to lose the support of allies and sympathetic states are unlikely to be heeded by Putin.