The relationship between Belarus and the West over the year has been characterized by increasing sanctions pressure—provoked by the domestic policies of the Lukashenka regime and the dictator’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. By mid-year, EU member states overcame disagreements and agreed on a gradual synchronization of sanctions. The Baltic states and Poland were the most vocal proponents of tightening restrictions on the Lukashenka regime, which often caused problems not only for Belarusian authorities but also for the country’s citizens. Rotation within the EU bureaucracy and Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election raised the issue of whether the West has a strategy for Belarus. However, the key approach remains unchanged: the dual policy of “isolating the regime/supporting the people.” Democratic forces in exile are discussing options for easing pressure in exchange for the release of new groups of political prisoners. Meanwhile, the regime hopes to address its legitimacy problems in relations with the West through an invitation to participate in negotiations on resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
After lengthy discussions on synchronizing sanctions against Moscow and Minsk, the EU finally began to move in this direction: Brussels extended restrictions from the 12th, 13th, and 14th sanctions packages to the Belarusian economy. The new measures are aimed at addressing the problem of sanctions evasion due to the high level of integration between the Moscow and Minsk economies. The actions also target weakening Belarus’s economic and industrial bases and limiting the country’s ability to develop key sectors.
By the anniversary of the 2020 Belarusian protests, the West introduced new sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. In addition to ongoing repression, Minsk’s complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine also served as grounds. Thus, the 2020 political crisis in Belarus and the regime’s complicity in the war have come to be seen by the West as two sides of the same coin. This means that any hypothetical normalization of relations between Minsk and the West would require not only the release of political prisoners but also an explicit renunciation of support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Minsk demonstrates no willingness to make concessions on either front that could reduce sanctions pressure.
The US, for its part, outlined its approach through an updated version of the “Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2024.” In the document, the US Congress calls for:
- Not recognizing the Lukashenka regime,
- Recognizing the Coordination Council and the United Transitional Cabinet as legitimate institutions for dialogue,
- Continuing to impose targeted sanctions against the Lukashenka regime in cooperation with the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries and organizations.
The initiative to intensify sanctions pressure on the Belarusian regime has generally come from the Baltic states and Poland. For instance, following the introduction of another EU sanctions package against Belarus, Warsaw also tightened restrictions, including limiting the export of certain goods. Polish authorities have also threatened to completely block freight rail and land connections with Belarus due to ongoing migration pressure on their borders.
Although the new EU sanctions have strengthened sectoral economic restrictions on the regime, they have also impacted ordinary Belarusians. The ban on crossing the border in vehicles with Belarusian license plates has sharply reduced people’s mobility. In contrast to these restrictions, the Belarusian government, on the contrary, introduced a new temporary visa-free regime in July for 35 European countries.
Poland, in turn, formulated conditions for normalizing relations with Belarus:
- Stop hybrid attacks at the border,
- Release Andrzej Poczobut and other political prisoners,
- Extradite the murderer of a Polish soldier killed during a migrant assault on the border.
In response, the new Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou stated that Warsaw would not be able to blackmail Minsk by blocking freight traffic across the border—Belarus would not make concessions under pressure from ultimatums and would defend its interests. Minsk expects that Warsaw will eventually be forced to cooperate, as it will not be able to maintain a blockade of freight flows for long, which affect the interests of the entire EU, China, and Poland itself.
Indeed, Poland has so far been unable to block freight rail traffic with Belarus due to the need for coordination with EU allies. Instead, Warsaw artificially slowed traffic at land and rail checkpoints, leading to long queues at the Polish border.
Meanwhile, in addition to similar restrictions, the Lithuanian government submitted materials to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding cross-border crimes against humanity committed by the Lukashenka regime against Belarusians. The case against Lukashenka at the ICC increases pressure on the regime amidst Minsk’s unwillingness to make concessions, such as ending repression, releasing political prisoners, halting migration pressure, and ceasing support for Russia in its war against Ukraine.
On the eve of the New Year, the EU adopted its 15th sanctions package against Russia and Belarus, despite calls from some representatives of democratic forces to ease sanctions against the regime in exchange for the release of several groups of political prisoners. This approach could ideally lead to new rounds of pardons by the regime. However, to ease pressure, the regime must not only end repression but also cease its involvement in the war.
Earlier, Belarusian propagandists stated that further pardons, especially for opposition leaders, were impossible without significant concessions from the West, such as reopening airspace or lifting sanctions on industrial enterprises. On the other hand, the Belarusian KGB declared that Minsk would not exchange foreign citizens imprisoned for espionage for Belarusians held abroad. This indicates that the regime is not interested in de-escalating tensions with its neighbors.
The tightening of Western sanctions marks that a return to business as usual is unlikely. In response to previously imposed Western sanctions packages, the Belarusian government expanded its embargo on imports from “unfriendly” countries. At the same time, Belarusian officials claim successful adaptation to Western sanctions. Nevertheless, persistent complaints about transportation and financial blockades aimed at destabilizing the internal situation highlight the fragility of this process.
Nonetheless, the regime attempted to revive discussions on exemptions from Western sanctions on Belarusian potash fertilizers under the pretext of global food security. Brazil, through Portugal, Spain, and several other European countries, actively lobbied for easing restrictions on potash. Minsk also tried to promote this issue through the UN and Global South countries. However, due to the overlapping sanctions regimes of American and European restrictions, the initiative failed.
Furthermore, Minsk sought to use its “Trojan horses” (notably, cooperation with Hungary) to block new EU sanctions. The regime also hoped that EU countries would soon “grow tired” of the Belarusian opposition in exile. As a result, they would begin to evaluate information from partners about threats from Belarus more objectively and come to understand the necessity of dialogue with Minsk in the interest of regional stability and security.
Through the II International Conference on Eurasian Security and a conference on illegal migration, the Lukashenka regime sought to reset dialogue with the West on regional and global security issues. The regime once again tried to capitalize on these issues, particularly in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, in exchange for a return to business as usual with Western partners. Official Minsk sought to restore institutional cooperation with security agencies, renew financial support, and lift sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. However, the absence of Western representatives at these events underscored the continued high level of distrust in Minsk’s initiatives.
Personnel changes in European bureaucratic institutions raised questions about the future EU approach to the Belarusian issue, considering the focus on the Russia-Ukraine war and the uncertainty following Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election. However, maintaining the EU’s inertia-based approach seems the most likely scenario. The EU will continue to support and strengthen its dual policy: isolating the Lukashenka regime and supporting the Belarusian people. This includes intensifying sanctions, supporting civil society and democratic forces, ensuring mobility for ordinary Belarusians, and advocating for the release of political prisoners.
Democratic forces also sought to keep US attention on the Belarusian issue amid the presidential administration’s transition. Accordingly, proposed strategies include maintaining pressure on the Lukashenko regime, supporting civil society, holding the regime accountable, and removing Belarus from Russia’s sphere of influence.
Against this backdrop, the Belarusian regime actively demonstrated its desire to participate in peace negotiations on resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, Minsk has not articulated its position or interests. Another obstacle is Lukashenka’s image as a co-aggressor and puppet of Russia in the eyes of Ukraine and its partners. The Security Guarantees Treaty within the Union State further entrenched Belarus in Russia’s sphere of influence, and the Lukashenka regime shows neither the will nor resources for a positive contribution to regional security. Clearly, Lukashenka aims to gain recognition from Ukraine’s Western allies through an invitation to participate in negotiations.
Kyiv’s position is clear: the only thing Belarusian officials are entitled to is a fair trial for their aggression against Ukraine, not participation in negotiations. At the same time, Kyiv believes it necessary to discuss in hypothetical negotiations what role Belarus would play in the future regional security configuration and what guarantees would ensure no repeat of a Russian invasion from Belarusian territory. Earlier, Kyiv took the first step toward building institutional relations with Belarusian democratic forces in exile, following the example of several Western countries, by creating a special envoy position for Belarus. This marks a point of no return in relations between official Kyiv and Minsk, driven by the regime’s continued complicity in the war.
Forecasts:
• The West will continue increasing sanctions pressure on the Lukashenka regime until the basic conditions are met: stopping repression, releasing political prisoners, and ending participation in the war against Ukraine.
• The initiative to tighten European sanctions against Belarus will come from Poland, which will preside over the EU starting January 1, 2025, until the regime meets Warsaw’s conditions.
• The West does not expect free and democratic presidential elections in Belarus in 2025 and does not plan to recognize their results, raising questions about the legitimacy of the Lukashenka regime.
• The Lukashenka regime’s involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine and worsening domestic political situation will lead to full synchronization of Western sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
• Possible de-escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and participation in hypothetical negotiations will not allow the Lukashenka regime to resolve issues of international legitimacy in the eyes of the West.
