The Dictator’s Benefit: The Regime Passed a Stress Test

The ruling class conducted a fully controlled campaign to renew the dictator’s legitimacy. Lukashenka consolidated the nomenclature and security forces around him with financial incentives, expanded the circle of supporters through propaganda, and simultaneously demotivated opponents with repression. The election results are expected to reassure the dictator and reinforce the trend toward a political thaw in society.

The main beneficiaries of Lukashenka regime are high-ranking officials, state sector managers, propagandists, and security forces. They reap the greatest benefits from budget redistribution and the expropriation of property from businesses and opponents. The dictator’s personnel policy is increasingly reminiscent of oprichnina—placing his personal bodyguards, originating from the Security Service, into high-ranking positions. Notably, the ruling class is striving to conceal these trends from the public. Over the past four years, access to state information and statistics has been significantly restricted. These measures have heightened the system’s opacity, undermined transparency in budget allocation, and obscured personnel decisions.

Lukashenka personally oversaw the implementation of the “special electoral operation.” Moreover, the dictator actively participated in campaigning and met with state sector workers, despite evident health problems. This sharply contrasts with the 2020 presidential campaign, when the politician interacted exclusively with security forces amidst low approval ratings and widespread protests.

On the eve of voting, regime political strategists stirred public interest with candidate debates to draw attention and mobilize the audience. It is worth noting that officials allocated substantial budgetary resources to Lukashenka’s campaign, which began months before its official announcement.

During the campaign, public checks and balances were absent. As a result, the Central Election Commission announced record-high early voting numbers, which cannot be verified. The ruling class dismantled legislative and institutional mechanisms for public oversight of the electoral process. However, to create the desired perception of election results among the population, the vertical power structure orchestrated a large-scale campaign for forced mobilization in early voting.

The regime sought to instill loyal behavior among sympathizers—state sector workers and beneficiaries of state resources. Election organizers actively engaged potential Lukashenka supporters in the voting process. Notably, the ruling class gradually restored trust in state institutions, thereby expanding the circle of the dictator’s sympathizers.

Simultaneously, security forces demotivated regime opponents through repression. Propagandists cultivated a sense of helplessness among supporters of change. According to independent sociologists, opponents of Lukashenka exhibit the highest rates of abstentionism and a belief in the predetermined outcome favoring Lukashenka.

To prevent protest mobilization, the regime implemented internet filtering in the final days of voting, blocking specific services and access to foreign websites.

Lukashenka continues to release political prisoners in small groups. These measures influence the formation of corresponding “pacifist” trends among loyalists. According to independent sociologists, regime supporters anticipate a political thaw following the conclusion of the presidential campaign.

Meanwhile, the ruling class demonstrates adherence to legislative frameworks as the regime regains stability. Propagandists and Lukashenka’s confidants ceased public appearances following allegations of legal violations.

Thus, the ruling class, aiming to preserve power and project “stability,” will continue selective releases of political prisoners and a gradual softening of the domestic political climate.