Purges in the public sector against dissenters continue despite the staffing shortages in various sectors of the economy. The dictator frees up prison spaces for another batch of politically motivated prisoners through the amnesty of political prisoners. The new wave of repression is the result of a significant strengthening of the role of security forces in state governance over the past four years.
Dictator Lukashenka adjusted his staffing policy after 2020: he is actively placing security officials in leadership positions in civil agencies, state organizations, and even GoNGOs. This trend has persisted throughout 2024. For instance, Lukashenka appointed his personal bodyguard as the executive director of a state-owned commercial bank. As a result, political purges have intensified in Belarusbank.
Officials are reverting to Soviet-era practices for resolving staffing shortages, which is unlikely to yield benefits. In some regions, Lukashenka’s vertical has intensified the fight against “parasites” (unemployed individuals). In a situation of deteriorating feedback and declining state governance quality, such measures accumulate protest potential within society.
The ruling class is attempting to camouflage the scale of political repression. These actions are most likely aimed at restoring the regime’s reputation at the international level. At the same time, the authorities are taking steps to motivate participants in the repressive apparatus. This involves increasing the anonymity of the perpetrators of repression and removing documentary evidence of political persecution.
Repressions against dissenters and the release of political prisoners are occurring in accordance with the internal transformations of the regime. It is unlikely that these processes depend on external factors. The dictator is trying to maintain the personalistic nature of the regime, relying on the security apparatus. Large-scale political purges strengthen the cohesion of the public sector and its unity around Lukashenko’s persona.
After 2020, politically motivated prisoners significantly increased the burden on the country’s penitentiary system and, consequently, the expenses for its maintenance. Out of a total of about 33,000 prisoners, about 1,300 are political prisoners. Prior to 2020, such a large category of prisoners did not exist in Belarusian prisons. This forces the dictator to pardon political prisoners in small groups but regularly, in order to reduce the overcrowding of the system.
At the same time, the regime’s enforcers continue to imprison new dissenters. On December 9, it became known about another group of 29 pardoned political prisoners. However, between December 9 and 13, at least 82 people were sentenced in political criminal cases. The number of political cases could be even higher, as not all instances come to the attention of human rights defenders.
The release of political prisoners strengthens the discussion among the regime’s opponents about changing the strategy, amplifying the voices of critics of the Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya coalition. This is an additional indirect effect of the pardons.
At the same time, the ruling class is trying to enhance ideological indoctrination of the population and expand the circle of loyal groups — primarily through the youth. The demand for ideology among Lukashenka’s elites is increasing as the dictator ages. Lukashenka’s eventual departure from power (e.g., due to natural causes) would create a power vacuum and a significant political crisis. The hypertrophied presidential branch of power has negatively affected the development of other state institutions.
Thus, Lukashenka will continue the process of releasing political prisoners while maintaining the level of repression and persecution of dissenters on political grounds.
