Pre-Election Liberalization of the Criminal Code

After restoring a full-fledged personalist regime, Lukashenka is signaling intentions to ease pressure on society (though this does not apply to political opponents). Simultaneously, the authorities aim to boost electoral ratings, as the conditions for holding elections and renewing Lukashenka’s legitimacy have already been established. The regime plans to expand its base beyond loyalists by focusing on anti-corruption measures and softening criminal laws.

Four years after the large-scale protests against falsifications and violence, Lukashenka has reasserted his personal monopoly on power. The politician has consolidated the state apparatus around himself through dismissals and personnel purges. Repressions in various sectors of the state, such as culture, continue to this day.

The dictator successfully thwarted the transformation of his personalist autocracy into collective governance. In 2020-21, there were hopes within the ruling class for a power transition from the president to other institutions or a successor. However, after the suppression of the protest movement and the 2022 referendum, the opposite trend prevailed – the establishment of a cult of personality around Lukashenka.

Representative institutions—parliament, local councils, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly with expanded powers—remain rudimentary organs of the Lukashenka regime. Although, within these nominal institutions, the interests of regional and local factions of the ruling class are adjusted.

The dictator uses anti-corruption crackdowns on officials for personnel rotation. Sometimes the autocrat may simply demote an official, as in the case of former Agriculture Minister Bartash. Other mechanisms, such as elections, remain blocked.

In his hometown of Shklou, the dictator once again returned to his favorite pre-election theme—fighting corruption. This tactic has allowed Lukashenka to raise electoral ratings since the first presidential election in 1994. The politician activated the anti-corruption agenda at the beginning of summer, thus launching his presidential campaign.

At the same time, corruption is an integral part of the redistribution system built by Lukashenka, as well as a reward for loyalty. For example, according to an investigation by BIC, Lukashenka’s associates use “gray” export schemes for potash. The dictator personally decides on anti-corruption crackdowns against the leadership of the vertical power structure and major state companies. The targets are typically disgraced officials, while loyalists remain untouched due to the system’s opacity and personal connections with Lukashenka.

Economic growth and the improvement of the population’s welfare have positively impacted the increase in trust ratings for state institutions. As a result, Lukashenka can afford slight liberalization in areas that do not threaten his monopoly on power. For instance, the ruling class shows a willingness to soften certain criminal articles, including anti-drug laws. Although, the security forces might be displeased with these relaxations. The softening of criminal laws is declared exclusively concerning citizens loyal to the regime. Security forces continue to take harsh measures against Lukashenka’s opponents.

Thus, it is likely that the ruling class aims to prevent severe polarization of society during the elections, which could escalate into violent confrontation.