Elections 2025: Lukashenka Strives to Regain Legitimacy with Carrots and Sticks

The regime is actively launching a campaign in support of Lukashenka, even though the elections have not yet been officially announced. The dictator is shaping an image of himself as a defender of the country’s independence and security, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. Simultaneously, the ruling class is expanding repression and curtailing the civil rights of Belarusians.

Lukashenka is giving serious attention to conducting the presidential campaign, which distinguishes these elections from those in 2020. Back then, he distanced himself from the campaign’s start, displaying confidence. However, in the final months of the 2020 elections, he was forced to focus on consolidating the security forces around him. These structures became the main pillar of the dictator’s power preservation, in the absence of public support and amidst high protest mobilization in 2020.

In 2025, the autocrat aims to expand his electoral base. Lukashenka seeks to rally broad groups of the population around him. Large-scale events are being held in the regions as part of the “Unity Marathon.” The politician himself is taking part in pre-election tours. The ruling class is emphasizing external risks and threats to the country’s independence, including the potential loss of territory.

The dictator is trying to create the image of a protector of Belarus’ interests against the backdrop of the democratic forces’ campaign for international isolation of the regime. Lukashenka’s rhetoric is aimed at weakening the united agenda of civil society. At the same time, the dictator’s promises of a quick power transition after another five-year term are easing tensions among supporters of change.

The politician is trying to raise his personal ratings among beneficiaries of state support. For instance, Lukashenka convened a meeting on improving social support for the population.

A staffing shortage is growing, and GDP growth is slowing down, which affects the functioning of certain sectors of the economy. The population is starting to feel the consequences of the deteriorating labor market. In Homel, city buses are not running on schedule due to staffing issues. In the capital’s tram depot, there is a shortage of drivers. In Minsk, social services have “classified” some statistical data on workforce shortages.

At the same time, the ruling class does not plan to ease the pressure on dissenters. The authorities are counting on propaganda manipulation (such as claims of high wages) and on the opposition’s fatigue from repression. Lukashenka has granted “new powers” to a commission for the return of political emigrants. Special services are summoning parents whose children live abroad for personal interviews.

The authorities hope to alleviate the staffing shortage by attracting pensioners to work. To this end, they plan to lift the pension cap for working retirees.

Regime enforcers continue large-scale efforts to demotivate opponents. Security forces are cracking down on initiatives that are still legally operating in Belarus.

Thus, the ruling class will maintain a high level of repression against dissent during the election campaign.