Elections 2025: Forcing Society into Total Loyalty to the Lukashenka’s Regime

The ruling class aims to showcase the mobilization of Belarusians in support of the state’s course and the leader of the regime. This reflects a trend towards total control and the ideological shaping of society. The ongoing power tug-of-war between the dictator and the nomenclature continues.

Propagandists are running a large-scale campaign in support of Lukashenka. Unlike in 2020, the dictator is compelled to personally engage in election events, continuing his regional tour.

The ruling class undertakes propaganda measures to display society’s consolidation around the state’s course. In the public sector, campaigns persist to purge dissenters and ideologically coerce loyalty.

The elections are held under a closed, force-driven operational mode. Lukashenka gathered  the heads of the security agencies, the President’s administration, and regional and Central Election Commission leadership for a meeting on his re-election.

Election organizers create favorable conditions for manipulation: authorities conceal the members of the territorial election commissions.

Regime enforcers carry out a large-scale campaign of activist detentions across regions.

The ruling class draws on Russian experience by introducing elements of “managed democracy.” The role of pro-government parties and GoNGOs in the political system is elevated. In addition to Lukashenka, the Central Election Commission has registered six initiative groups to nominate candidates for the presidency.

During the campaign, candidates from systemic political parties and GoNGOs highlight Lukashenka’s appeal to the electorate. The presidential candidate from the Communist Party even endorsed Lukashenka’s nomination.

The regime’s political strategists test the appeal of Hanna Kanapatskaya to the protest audience. The former parliamentarian seeks to occupy the niche of representing non-systemic opposition interests. Propagandists aim to divert support away from the democratic leader Tsikhanouskaya and reduce her influence on the international agenda regarding Belarus.

Some of the nomenclature continue preparing for a transitional period due to Lukashenka’s natural aging factors. Alternative candidates represent three out of four systemic political parties and two major GoNGOs.

The nomenclature-affiliated “Belaya Rus,” a large public association (230,000 patriotic members) and political party (50,000 members), is left without a presidential candidate. “Belaya Rus” aspires to the role of the “party of power.” Until 2020, Lukashenka frequently criticized the political ambitions of “Belaya Rus” functionaries, restraining its transformation into a party. However, the dictator was forced to agree to political system reforms, cemented by the 2022 referendum. Yet the power struggle between the dictator and the nomenclature continues: over the past two years, Lukashenka has regained full power, with the cult of personality solidifying.

Simultaneously, Lukashenka decided to pardon 31 political prisoners. However, repression has intensified even further.

Nevertheless, after the election campaign, the ruling class will likely ease pressure on society—provided, of course, that the election operation concludes successfully. For instance, the dictator may continue releasing political prisoners, likely in significantly larger groups.