2024: The Year of Cult of Personality Formation. 2025: Electoral Catharsis of the Regime

2024 — the year of cementing a personalist regime and formalizing the cult of personality around Lukashenka. The dictator has slowed down the transformation of the power system toward collective authoritarianism. Electoral mechanisms have turned into tools for mobilizing loyal groups of the population and gradually renewing the legitimacy of the ruling class. Against opponents of the regime, discrimination, confiscation of property, and repression have expanded. The ruling class has partially stabilized the economy amid sanctions and the costs of maintaining power through force. However, this was achieved at the expense of financial redistribution and restrictions on private businesses. Economic growth has helped sustain the welfare of the population and, accordingly, reinforce loyal behavior among people — although this occurred against the backdrop of a labor force outflow.

It is possible that after the Central Election Commission registers at the beginning of 2025 the “return of popular love” for the dictator, a process of gradually loosening repressive measures may begin. For this to happen, the autocrat’s support numbers must not fall below his previous election results — and must avoid visible protest mobilization.

In 2024, a new representative institution of the regime — the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA) — was created. Initially, the ABPA was conceived as the highest governing body for the transition of power from Lukashenka to a successor or other institutions. The ABPA was supposed to become a “superstructure” above the existing representative bodies. However, the dictator reneged on earlier promises of a swift departure from power, which he had voiced during the political crisis to the nomenklatura and the Kremlin. After elections to the parliament and local councils, Lukashenka sent a signal about extending his powers for a new five-year term — thereby refusing to transfer power. As a result, the ABPA turned into yet another “dormant” institution — like the parliament, local councils, or political parties.

Nevertheless, systemic political parties have strengthened their representation within governing structures. In the House of Representatives, 64% (70 out of 110) of deputies belong to political parties, with 51 parliamentarians representing “Belaya Rus.” In local councils, party members occupied 30.4% of the seats (3,803 out of 12,511), of which 3,234 are affiliated with “Belaya Rus.”

During the “single voting day” in February 2024, the ruling class tested a new format for election campaigns: all potentially dangerous players were excluded from the electoral process. This ensured that opposition candidates could not participate in political competition. However, the ruling class created the illusion of competition for vacancies in representative bodies between candidates from systemic parties. The same mechanism is now being used during the 2025 presidential campaign.

In particular, apart from Lukashenka, representatives of three regime-loyal political parties (excluding “Belaya Rus”) have been nominated for the presidency. Interestingly, the regime’s political technologists did not leave the electoral niche for constructive opposition vacant. This spot has been taken by Hanna Kanapatskaya, a former member of parliament and a candidate in the 2020 presidential elections. She is primarily noted for criticizing the leaders of the 2020 campaign — Viktar Babaryka and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya — and for positioning herself as a national democrat. The participation of a constructive opposition candidate in the 2025 elections is meant, on the one hand, to demonstrate the marginalization of regime opponents and, on the other hand, to weaken the coalition of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

Throughout the year, Lukashenka continued to appoint individuals from his close circle — including family members and representatives of the security bloc — to key positions in government. To strengthen control over regional nomenklatura, two plenipotentiaries were appointed for each region and Minsk (previously, there was one representative per region).

After elections to the parliament and local councils, propagandists actively resumed efforts to strengthen Lukashenka’s cult of personality. For example, during the presidential campaign, the dictator is participating in campaign events, contrasting with his behavior in 2020. As a result, the ruling class is orchestrating “pseudo-competitive” elections, where the electorate is pressured into demonstrating loyalty to the dictator. Students, state-sector workers, and public servants are being forced by ideologists to display “popular love” for Lukashenka. Independent observation has been completely banned — with severe penalties for noncompliance.

The regime’s enforcers have expanded the practice of confiscating property from political opponents and their relatives. New mechanisms for special production cases are being used against critics of Lukashenka outside Belarus. Repression is often disguised, and victims are forced to remain silent about persecution. Political persecution even affects activists of the “Russian World,” whose rhetoric sometimes conflicts with the interests of the ruling class. As a result, tensions periodically arise between state propagandists and pro-Russian activists, who, incidentally, have gained significant influence over the agenda.

The dictator’s personnel policy is focused on promoting security officials to leadership positions in civilian agencies, state organizations, and state-controlled NGOs (GoNGOs). This has led to regular political “purges” and an outflow of labor resources abroad. Over the year, the number of employed people in the economy decreased by 20,000; however, the negative trend is slowing. Lukashenka is trying to address staffing shortages by reallocating resources from the private sector to state enterprises and encouraging retirees to work. Private medical centers and educational institutions face increasing pressure: all private kindergartens in Minsk, as well as some universities and medical centers, have been closed.

The authorities are projecting economic optimism and declaring GDP growth. State investments and domestic demand are being supported through credit policies and wage increases. The state continues to regulate prices, while the National Bank maintains currency and financial stability. However, the regime is narrowing social guarantees in pensions, healthcare, and labor relations, focusing instead on supporting security forces.

The private sector continues to face pressure and expropriations. Small and medium-sized entrepreneurs are being constrained. Lukashenka retains his personal animosity toward this category of business.

Security forces hold a disproportionate role in the political and economic system. Their influence is being enhanced through Lukashenka’s personnel decisions and budgetary inflows. Security forces have significant leverage in the rotation of officials through anti-corruption persecution. Within the overall structure of power, security forces remain among the main beneficiaries on whom Lukashenka’s personalist regime relies.

Forecasts
• Lukashenka will continue to strengthen personal power and slow the transformation of the regime toward collective governance. The influence of the dictator’s family and close associates in state administration will expand.

• Security forces will maintain a high level of political “purges” in state enterprises and budget-funded institutions. Control over loyalty to the regime will intensify — including through stricter ideological filters for employment. At the same time, enforcers of repression will strive to minimize the visibility of political persecution.

• The ruling class will continue to reduce social programs and guarantees for the population — including for pensioners and large families. The government will limit welfare spending: it will soften price controls, slow wage increases, and moderate pension growth. Most resources will be redirected to strengthen the security apparatus and ensure ideological loyalty.

• The government will support large-scale investments in state-owned companies and projects, including seeking financial support from Russia.

• The ruling class may adopt contradictory economic measures, combining pressure on the private sector with the redistribution of resources in markets. These processes will actively involve security forces and business people close to the dictator.