The Apple of Discord Among Democratic Forces: Political Prisoners

Tensions, mutual accusations, and struggles for resources are growing within the democratic forces. Some political parties are attempting to strengthen their positions within the democratic movement by accusing Tsikhanouskaya’s coalition of failing in their strategy to free political prisoners. Addressing the interests of opposition factions within the coalition may help to ease these tensions.

Criticism of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s coalition intensified after it became clear that Belarusian political prisoners were not included in the exchange between the Kremlin and Western countries. Opponents of the democratic leader have blamed her for the lack of progress in securing the release of Belarusian activists from prison. This criticism has resonated with some opponents of the Lukashenka regime, who had hoped that negotiations between the West and the Lukashenko regime might result in the release of political prisoners.

The coalition of politicians led by former Coordination Council (CC) speaker Andrei Yahorau lost influence over the agenda after the CC elections. This coalition is trying to position itself as another center of attraction for critics of Tsikhanouskaya. The “Belarusians” faction within the CC initially recognized Tsikhanouskaya as the national leader but now wants to withdraw their support. Unlike the mainstream sanctions approach toward the official Minsk, this coalition promotes the idea of exchanging Western ambassadors for political prisoners.

However, the democratic forces are not a full-fledged negotiating party for the regime. Throughout his rule, Lukashenka has adhered to a zero-sum game strategy, aiming for the complete marginalization of his opponents. Even during the largest protests in the history of independent Belarus in 2020, Lukashenka blocked any possibility of dialogue between the ruling class and his opponents. First, the security forces forced the elected president Tsikhanouskaya into exile. Then, the Investigative Committee launched criminal cases against other protest leaders—the Presidium of the CC. In August 2020, this body was created with representatives from Babaryka’s and Tsikhanouskaya’s teams to overcome the political crisis and engage in negotiations with the regime.

The development of repression follows an internal logic. The prolonged persecution of opponents is tied to the ruling class’s desire to demotivate the protest movement after the trauma of 2020. These preventive measures also aim to prevent potential protests in 2025 during the next elections.

Thus, the devaluation of Tsikhanouskaya’s leadership will significantly weaken the voice of civil society on the international stage.