The democratic forces of Belarus tested new electoral mechanisms to renew the legitimacy of the Coordination Council. During the elections to this organization, feedback from activists improved, and priorities in working with civil society were adjusted. The agenda expanded beyond the policy of isolating Lukashenka’s regime towards increasing the mobility of Belarusians. Nevertheless, the mobilization capacity of political organizations reverted to the apathy of the 2000s–2010s. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya retained a leading role in shaping and representing the overall agenda of the democratic forces on the international stage. The most significant diplomatic achievement was her participation in the G7 summit, which contrasted with Lukashenka’s participation in the SCO summit. The diplomatic activities of the democratic forces yielded mixed results. They achieved significant success in advocating for the interests of the diaspora. This occurred against the backdrop of declining global attention to Belarus and increasing restrictions on Belarusians. Political organizations focused on internal issues and foreign policy activities, gradually distancing themselves from audiences within Belarus. The reasons for this were high levels of repression and the desire to protect activists from persecution. At the same time, the ideological monolithism of Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, the United Transitional Cabinet, and the Coordination Council strengthened. This provoked growing criticism from the opposition, which accused the majority coalition of ignoring minority interests and monopolizing resources.
One of the significant political events of 2024 was the delayed elections to the Coordination Council (CC), which had controversial consequences. The launch of the elections was postponed several times due to debates about electoral procedures. The election of CC members was a response to regime-held elections for the National Assembly and local councils. Despite technical support and extensive coverage, the voting results revealed political apathy in Belarusian society after four years of authoritarian backlash.
On the one hand, organizers created a secure online voting mechanism, minimizing risks of external interference and system breaches. High participation by nominees attracted the attention of independent media. Despite the regime’s recognition of the electoral lists as “extremist formations,” about 270 candidates contested 80 seats. As a result of the elections, effective coordination and swift decision-making were achieved through the victory of lists aligned with Tsikhanouskaya’s Office and the United Transitional Cabinet (UTC).
On the other hand, the democratic forces failed to engage not only broad groups of Belarusian society but also the diaspora. Approximately 6,700 people participated in the voting—a number comparable to the opposition primaries before the 2020 elections. Some prominent politicians—Zianon Pazniak, Valery Tsapkala, and Volha Karach—refused to participate due to the risk of reputational losses. Following the formation of the new CC composition, internal disagreements intensified, with accusations of monopolizing decision-making and resources by the Office and the Cabinet.
The democratic forces and independent media did not form a consensus among supporters regarding sanctions. The UTC’s positions are gradually being recalibrated, emphasizing sanctions against the regime and increased mobility for Belarusians.
Political organizations in Tsikhanouskaya’s coalition did not nominate candidates for the regime’s representative bodies. Tsikhanouskaya urged supporters to boycott elections to parliament and local councils, further narrowing the democratic forces’ influence on the domestic agenda. Representatives of the democratic movement pursued different tactics, from boycotts to voting “against all,” but no full-fledged campaigns were conducted.
Ahead of the 2025 presidential campaign, the democratic forces announced a review of approaches and began discussions on strategy. However, repression during the elections complicated communication with Belarusian society. The circle of supporters narrowed to staunch regime opponents, and the rhetoric became more radical.
Mainstream approaches of Tsikhanouskaya’s coalition include isolating the regime, holding Lukashenka accountable, supporting civil society, and releasing political prisoners. This is enshrined in the “Platform 2025.” The democratic forces’ campaign to hold the regime accountable through the International Criminal Court is among the most effective. This year, Lithuania submitted documents about Lukashenka’s crimes to The Hague. Lithuania’s lawsuit to the ICC was supported by the foreign ministries of Poland and Latvia.
The Kalinouski Regiment held meetings with the Belarusian diaspora in Europe (Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Germany), aiming to consolidate supporters of regime change by force and strengthen their influence in the democratic movement. This led to closer ties between the fighters and Tsikhanouskaya’s coalition. The founder of the Kalinouski movement, Vadzim Kabanchuk, received a position in the UTC.
Amid the regime’s isolation by Western capitals, the democratic forces strengthened their diplomatic positions. Tsikhanouskaya’s participation in the G7 meeting was a significant success, enhancing the democratic movement’s position in the eyes of the international community. The democratic forces actively cooperate with the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and the governments of the USA, Canada, Lithuania, and Poland. Political organizations are multiplying their experience in strategic dialogue with Washington. In November, strategic consultations between the Canadian government and the democratic forces took place in Ottawa.
Tsikhanouskaya’s coalition is developing diplomatic achievements in the post-Soviet space. For instance, it is increasing the level of contact with Armenia’s leadership amid growing tensions between Yerevan and Lukashenka. Meanwhile, the III Belarusian-Ukrainian “Forum Astrozhkich” took place in Kyiv, involving representatives of Tsikhanouskaya’s Cabinet, the CC, and Ukrainian politicians.
However, the democratic forces faced criticism and reputational losses. The absence of Belarusian political prisoners in exchanges between the Kremlin and the West caused tension and criticism. Nevertheless, the broad coalition did not revise its approaches to isolating the regime and maintaining sanctions pressure on Lukashenko.
Decreased funding for independent media reinforced the dominance of state and pro-Kremlin media in Belarus’ information space. This particularly affected certain editorial teams in Poland, such as “Radio Unet” and “Belsat.”
The potential and mobilization capabilities of solidarity funds are significantly shrinking. In 2024, they raised less money compared to previous years. The organizers of the “Voice Across Borders” relay attracted only EUR 7.3 thousand. The campaign was initiated by a coalition of organizations: BYSOL, ByHelp, Dissidentby, People’s Embassies, and “Country for Life.” This is a significant regression compared to the 2023 solidarity marathon “We Do Care,” which raised EUR 574.0 thousand.
The democratic forces compensated for the decline in collections by creating an International Humanitarian Fund, attracting over EUR 2 million from foreign donors.
Additionally, activists launched the crowdfunding platform Gronka, replacing the popular platforms MolaMola and Ulej, which were destroyed by the regime in 2020.
An important direction for solidarity funds remains the evacuation of activists persecuted by the regime. Lukashenka’s security forces have not dismantled this network, despite numerous provocations.
The “Cyber Partisans” continued to attack regime structures. In 2024, they inflicted damage on state giant “Hrodna Azot” and hacked KGB databases.
Amid the authoritarian backlash, depoliticization of society is observed. A lack of new leaders and declining activism reflects a general trend. Changes in the UTC leadership indicate challenges related to a personnel shortage, declining efficiency, and narrowing audiences for the democratic forces. Over the year, four key representatives of Tsikhanouskaya left the UTC—diplomat Kavaleuski, security official Sakashchyk, former political prisoner Harbunova (initiator of the “We Do Care” marathon), and journalist Alina Koushyk. The first three left due to disagreements with Tsikhanouskaya’s team. As a result, the positions of the head of the National Anti-Crisis Management and UTC deputy head Pavel Latushka significantly strengthened.
Nevertheless, in 2024, Tsikhanouskaya maintained her leadership in the democratic movement. She continued to set the agenda and supported the unity of a broad coalition of political and civil organizations.
Forecasts:
- Tensions are increasing within the democratic forces, threatening the disintegration of the coalition led by Tsikhanouskaya. The main factor is the disregard of minority opposition interests in the Coordination Council’s activities. Part of the opposition actively promotes an alternative agenda focused on de-escalating rhetoric toward Lukashenka’s regime.
- Despite challenges, the Coordination Council remains an important element of the democratic forces’ architecture. It continues to serve as a platform for reconciling the interests of various civil society players. However, there is a risk that tensions will grow if minority opposition interests are not considered.
- Pressure on Tsikhanouskaya from opposition centers outside coalition formations is increasing, challenging her legitimacy and attempting to undermine her leadership position. These actions may negatively impact the ability to represent a unified civil society agenda internationally.
