The Kremlin Shields Belarus with a Nuclear Umbrella but Silences Its Voice

The Kremlin has adopted a new nuclear doctrine, extending nuclear security guarantees to Belarus. In the event of a critical threat to Belarus’ territorial integrity or sovereignty, Russia is prepared to use nuclear weapons. However, Minsk has been excluded from the decision-making process.

Vladimir Putin has approved a revised version of the “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Essentially, this is an updated Russian nuclear doctrine. The Kremlin’s approach to nuclear weapons remains unchanged: they are seen as a “deterrent, the use of which is an extreme and forced measure.” However, the new doctrine outlines an increased number of scenarios under which Russia might employ nuclear weapons (NW).

The Kremlin explained that the doctrine needed to be updated due to changes in the military-political environment, particularly the authorization given by the U.S., U.K., and France for Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory with Western long-range missile systems.

The new document identifies five conditions under which Russia could resort to using NW against potential adversaries:

1. Receiving credible information about the launch of ballistic missiles targeting Russia and/or its allies (existing condition).
2. The use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies, including Russian military units and facilities abroad (existing condition, expanded to include “Russian military units and facilities abroad”).
3. Impact on key Russian state or military facilities that could disrupt retaliatory nuclear actions (existing condition).
4. Armed aggression against Russia and Belarus using conventional weapons that pose critical threats to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity (existing condition, expanded to include “Belarus”).
5. Credible information about a massive launch and border crossing by Russian airspace attack systems, such as strategic aircraft, cruise missiles, and hypersonic vehicles (new condition).

Moscow now categorizes potential adversaries as individual states or military coalitions (blocs or alliances) possessing nuclear weapons or significant conventional forces. Additionally, any state providing territory or resources for aggression against Russia is also considered an adversary. The Kremlin views any aggressive action by a member of a bloc or coalition, even if not nuclear, as a joint attack. The same applies to aggression against Russia and/or its allies by a non-nuclear state supported or involving a nuclear state.

These provisions clearly reflect the Kremlin’s perception of Western involvement in the conflict with Ukraine and aim to deter further escalation, including deeper forms of military assistance—such as the potential deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine or approval of Kyiv’s requests for long-range weapon systems capable of striking deep into Russian territory.

Belarus is mentioned several times in the new nuclear doctrine. First, aggression against Belarus is included as one of the scenarios warranting NW use by Russia. Second, Belarus falls under the principle of centralized nuclear weapon use, including those deployed outside Russian territory. This principle means that the decision to use NW is made by the Russian president, while the planning and execution are handled by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

Thus, the Belarusian leadership is excluded from the decision-making process. Furthermore, the ambiguity and vagueness in defining critical threats to sovereignty and/or territorial integrity significantly lower the threshold for Russia’s potential use of NW.