Russia is amassing missile weapons in Belarus ahead of large-scale joint maneuvers in 2025

Throughout 2024, the Russian Federation has been accumulating significant stockpiles of rocket and artillery ammunition for aviation and ground systems at Belarusian storage bases. The volume of these supplies currently lags behind similar deliveries made in 2022. However, these actions are taking place against the backdrop of preparations for large-scale joint exercises of the Regional Group of Forces, scheduled for 2025. The early saturation of Belarus with aviation and ground missile strike systems is an indirect sign of preparations for the potential reopening of the “Belarusian front.”

A Russian military transport aircraft, the An-124, landed for the first time in a year and a half at the “Machulishchi” military airfield near Minsk. Prior to this, the aircraft was in Vladivostok and Ulyanovsk. After staying for four hours, the transport plane flew back. In March of this year, the An-124 of the Russian Aerospace Forces landed twice at the military airfield near Baranovichi, which is located near an aircraft repair plant.

The heavy military transport aircraft An-124 “Ruslan” is designed for:

• Delivering troops with standard combat equipment and armaments from the country’s rear to theaters of military operations (TMO);
• Transporting troops between TMOs and within rear zones;
• Reinforcing airborne units with heavy combat equipment;
• Delivering cargo to naval forces in oceanic TMOs;
• Transporting heavy and oversized civilian goods.

Earlier, two MiG-31K fighter jets landed at the “Machulishchi” airbase. These are carriers of the Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” hypersonic aero-ballistic missiles. After maneuvers in the southern direction, the aircraft returned to Russia.

Therefore, it is possible that the An-124 might have transported a batch of missile weaponry for the MiG-31K and other aircraft, as well as military equipment.

Throughout 2024, Russia has been amassing stockpiles of missile weapons for aviation and ground complexes at storage bases in Belarus. Over 9 months, the Russian Federation delivered more than 2,500 tons of ammunition to Belarus, along with dozens of units of various military equipment and components. The largest deliveries were received by the 2631st missile armament and ammunition airbase (Prudok, Vitebsk region). Additionally, ammunition trains with a total weight of 1,430 tons also arrived at Belarusian stations in Bobr (391st artillery ammunition base), Stolbtsy (25th rocket and artillery armament arsenal), and Centrolit (1393rd artillery ammunition base).

So far, these numbers are far from the amount of ammunition that the Russians brought into Belarus ahead of the large-scale aggression against Ukraine in January-February 2022. At that time, 1,300 railcars carrying 35,100 tons of ammunition were involved. However, just as in 2022, the bulk of the ammunition will likely be delivered together with the Russian contingent if the Kremlin decides to reopen the “Belarusian front.”

All this is happening amidst new details emerging about the planned joint strategic maneuvers of the Regional Group of Forces (RGF) of Belarus and Russia on Belarusian territory in 2025.

In early September, a delegation of Russian Armed Forces personnel visited Minsk on a working visit aimed specifically at preparing for the exercises. During the visit, they conducted a visual inspection of troop deployment sites for the duration of the exercises. Unofficially, it was reported that these maneuvers will be among the largest in the history of the RGF.

In February 2024, the head of the military department, Viktor Khrenin, stated that in 2025, exercises with the RGF will take place on Belarusian territory. A similar statement was made on September 9 by State Security Council Secretary Alexander Volfovich.

The exercises will involve the latest models of military equipment and weapons, including air defense systems, tanks, and electronic warfare (EW) equipment. Particular attention will be given to working out interactions between the Russian Armed Forces and the Belarusian Armed Forces in the context of hypothetical conflicts involving high-tech threats, such as UAVs and cyberattacks.

It is also known that during the exercises, “tasks related to the integration of new military units from the Russian Armed Forces, which will arrive in Belarus by the end of 2024,” will be practiced.

Thus, the Kremlin is methodically preparing the groundwork for the possible reopening of the “Belarusian front” under the guise of joint strategic RGF exercises. The preliminary accumulation of ammunition in Belarus ahead of these maneuvers is a logical step by the Kremlin.