The Kremlin once again stated that the protection of Belarus is a key component of Russia’s new nuclear doctrine. Simultaneously, the Lukashenka’s regime reminded the world of the presence of several dozen nuclear warheads delivered from Russia to Belarus. Although the new security agreements between Minsk and Moscow lack a joint decision-making procedure for the use of nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that the Kremlin has the final say in this matter.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the inclusion of security guarantees for Belarus in the updated nuclear doctrine. He emphasized that threats to Belarus would be considered threats to Russia, and the Kremlin would take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of its ally. Notably, such threats now include armed aggression using conventional weapons that pose critical risks to the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity of Russia or Belarus. This condition is nearly identical to provisions in the recently signed Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State in Minsk.
The treaty outlines mutual military support in cases of deliberate creation or realization of threats to the sovereignty, independence, and/or constitutional order of the parties, as well as the integrity and inviolability of the territory and external borders of the Union State. Possible responses to such threats include the deployment of Russian military bases and other facilities in Belarus, as well as the use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
According to the treaty, conditions for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons include a nuclear attack or the use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as aggression using conventional weapons. This aggression must pose a critical threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Russia or Belarus.
However, the treaty does not specify the procedures to be followed in such scenarios. It merely states that decisions regarding the use of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory will be made according to an additional procedure agreed upon by the parties.
Lukashenka confirmed the deployment of several dozen nuclear warheads in Belarus. The dictator emphasized that these tactical nuclear weapons are significantly more powerful than some other types of arms and that their use would be an immediate response to aggression against the country.
Despite Lukashenka’s statements and the signing of agreements with Russia on the deployment of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus, both Belarusian and foreign experts question the evidence supporting these claims, pointing to the lack of independent verification. Experts note that, while Russia’s nuclear weapons are usually stored in centralized bases during peacetime, the deployment in Belarus appears to follow wartime protocols—suggesting field conditions near delivery systems.
Lukashenka stated that the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus occurred at his request and is under his personal control. Belarusian State Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Walfovich claimed that Lukashenka has his own “red button” and “nuclear briefcase.” According to him, nuclear weapons in Belarus can only be used by the Belarusian president, whereas weapons located in Russia remain under the sole control of the Russian leader.
Despite the skepticism expressed by independent experts, the references to a “red button” and “nuclear briefcase” in Lukashenka’s hands may imply the final activation codes for nuclear warheads. According to Russian nuclear planning documents, the decision to use nuclear weapons in a theater of war can be delegated by the Russian president, following the issuance of an appropriate order (signal), to the commander of strategic or operational-strategic formations. These could include, for example, the Regional Grouping of Forces of Belarus and Russia. Accordingly, this suggests that at the final stage of the decision-making chain—namely, the activation of nuclear warheads—the Belarusian military leadership, integrated into the Joint Command, may be involved.
It is evident that the procedures for employing tactical nuclear weapons are designed in such a way that the Belarusian side acts solely as an executor of the Russian president’s decision, without the ability to block its implementation. Moreover, for Russia, such delegation of authority—and thus responsibility—is advantageous, as in the event of a retaliatory strike by NATO, Belarus, rather than Russia, would likely become the primary target. Apparently, this reality has yet to be fully grasped by the military-political leadership in Minsk.
