Lukashenka’s regime views the deployment of the Russian “Oreshnik” missile system in Belarus as a means of deterring NATO aggression against the country, and as a tool for exerting pressure on the West. The military rationale for such a move exists only if Russia is preparing for an apocalyptic scenario, where the missile system is used as a first/preemptive strike against targets in Europe. In such a case, if NATO responds, it would target Belarus, not Russia.
Lukashenka has instructed the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces to ensure the placement of the Russian “Oreshnik” missile system on Belarusian soil and to carefully plan its combat application. This directive follows an agreement between Lukashenka and Putin at a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State in Minsk, where the deployment of the system was scheduled for the second half of 2025. Similar to the justification for the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, Lukashenka allegedly requested Putin to deploy these missile systems in Belarus on his own initiative. In 2023, Lukashenko had already warned of his readiness to deploy strategic nuclear weapons—mobile ground-based “Topol-M” systems.
At the same time, Lukashenka emphasized that the targets for the “Oreshnik” would be determined by Belarus’ military-political leadership, with Russian specialists providing assistance in its operation. While Belarusian specialists are being trained, Russian experts will maintain the system and conduct launches against specified targets using “Oreshnik” warheads, similar to its recent use in Ukraine. This implies the deployment of new Russian military bases in Belarus, made possible by the security guarantees agreement signed by Lukashenka with Putin within the framework of the Union State.
The exact number of missile systems to be supplied is known only to the Russian president, and their locations will be chosen from existing strategic nuclear missile sites, with consideration given to the minimum distance from target areas.
The Belarusian side justifies the placement of “Oreshnik” as a response to the deployment of similar American intermediate-range weapons in Europe, the militarization of the region, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the information campaign aimed at discrediting the authorities of Belarus and its leadership in order to provoke or create conditions for conflicts.
In Minsk, there is confidence that the system will have a deterrent effect, similar to the nuclear weapons already stationed in Belarus, and will serve as a serious obstacle to potential NATO aggression.
Independent experts consider the deployment of “Oreshnik” in Belarus unlikely, viewing Lukashenka’s statements as bluffs and attempts to pressure the West. The regime does not particularly hide this motive, hoping to spark dialogue with Western partners and even lift sanctions from Minsk.
Experts also point out the military impracticality of deploying “Oreshnik,” due to the “dead zone” of ballistic missiles: if stationed in Brest, they would be incapable of hitting targets in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, or Ukraine. Moreover, they stress the vulnerability of “Oreshnik” if placed in Belarus, pointing out the potential for launchers to be targeted not only by missile systems or MLRS but even by conventional artillery or drones. Furthermore, the infrastructure for placing “Oreshnik” is in a dilapidated state.
However, considering that “Oreshnik” could be equipped with nuclear warheads, the only military rationale for its placement in Belarus from Moscow’s perspective is to deter NATO from joining the war on Ukraine’s side in case the conflict escalates further. Finally, in the most apocalyptic scenario, if the Kremlin decides to use the system against targets in Central and Western Europe, Belarus—not Russian territory—would become the target of NATO retaliation.
