“Historical exchange of spies” between the West and the Russian Federation showed the complete lack of subjectivity of the Lukashenka regime

Lukashenka regime did not earn political capital on the big exchange of “spies for political prisoners” between Russia and the West. This is due to the fact that Minsk played only a technical role, filling the exchange fund in the interests of Russia. The inability to use this action to solve problematic issues with Poland testifies to Minsk’s lack of subjectivity and complete dependence on the Kremlin. This also explains the reluctance of the regime to enter into meaningful negotiations with the West on the release/exchange of political prisoners in general. Normalization of relations between the West and the regime is not in the Kremlin’s interest.

The first “historic spy exchange” since the end of the Cold War resulted in the release of several prominent Russian political prisoners, as well as foreign nationals convicted in Russia on espionage charges. Among them are two U.S. citizens, an FRG citizen and a citizen with dual Russian and German citizenship.

The Kremlin initiated the exchange talks back in 2021, when it sought to free its agents imprisoned in Western countries. Moscow was particularly interested in FSB hitman Vadim Krasikov, who was sentenced to life in Germany in 2021 for the murder of Chechen warlord Zelimkhan Khangoshvili. Other Russian priorities included Anna and Artem Dultsev, convicted of spying for Russia in Slovenia in 2023, and Pablo Gonzalez (aka Russian Pavel Rubtsov), detained in Poland after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war on suspicion of spying for Russia. The exchange was preceded by years of coordination between Western allies represented by the United States, Germany, Slovenia and Poland, with the participation of the Russian opposition in exile – particularly the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF).

Although the process of preparing the exchange was coordinated through the Russian FSB and the US CIA, Lukashenka played a technical role in the exchange – he pardoned German citizen Rico Krieger, who was sentenced to capital punishment in Belarus. Lukashenka’s task was to push Germany for an early deal. Thanks to the Krieger case, Russia got a valuable hostage provided by Minsk into the “exchange fund.”

The participation in the exchange of Poland, on the one hand, and the Lukashenka regime, on the other, raised a serious question: could the Belarusan political prisoners have been included in the deal? It is already known that the Belarusan democratic forces not only were not admitted to the negotiations, but also did not know about the fact of their existence. But, objectively speaking, they had no chance to influence the process, since they have no one in custody who could interest the Kremlin or the West.

An even more important question is the following: why didn’t Lukashenka take advantage of the situation to solve one of the most problematic issues in relations with Poland? We are talking about the release from prison of a political prisoner and Belarusian journalist of Polish origin, Andrzej Poczobut. Warsaw’s involvement in the negotiations, as well as Lukashenka’s involvement in the operation at the command from the Kremlin, hypothetically created such a possibility. Especially since the release of Poczobut is one of the preconditions for the start of a dialogue on the normalization of the situation on the border between Warsaw and Minsk. However, Warsaw itself specifies that the negotiations on Poczobut’s release are held in a different mode, directly with representatives of Belarus.

Instead, the Belarusian side voiced an initially unacceptable proposal to release the politically imprisoned journalist Poczobut in exchange for the extradition of deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet, head of the People’s Anti-Crisis Board Pavel Latushka to Minsk. At the same time, there are about a dozen detained citizens of Belarus, accused of espionage and sabotage in the interests of the Russian and Belarusian security services, in Poland.

Such behavior of Minsk can be explained only by the following circumstances. First, the regime has completely lost its military-political autonomy and is forced to coordinate every step in foreign and military policy with Moscow. At this stage, therefore, the Russian side does not give the go-ahead for the release of political prisoners, including Pochobut. Instead, the Kremlin is interested in maintaining a permanent point of tension on the Belarus-Poland border in order to pull additional resources and divert the attention of NATO’s eastern flank countries from Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine. The fact that the German government did not react in any way to the proposal of dialog on the fate of Krieger from Minsk speaks about Berlin’s understanding of the subjectless and puppet character of the Belarusan regime.

Second, after the death of Alexei Navalny, it cannot be completely ruled out that the regime could also go to the elimination of a number of well-known Belarusan political prisoners in detention. The outside world has not received news about the condition of the leaders of the 2020 protest for a long time. Moreover, to date, at least six political prisoners have died in custody. In addition, there are at least three known deaths of people at large due to pressure or the effects of inhumane conditions in detention centers.

The start of any meaningful negotiations on the release or exchange of political prisoners with the West would inevitably reveal this fact and would only lead to increased sanctions pressure. Therefore, the regime prefers to ignore the West’s signals and sets initially impossible conditions, and exploits the tactic of “goodwill gestures” by releasing political prisoners on amnesty whose terms are coming to an end.