What Does Trump’s Victory Mean for Belarus-West Relations?

Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election could lead to certain changes in U.S.-Belarus relations. However, based on previous experience and the current geopolitical landscape, a dramatic shift is unlikely. In the eyes of the U.S., Belarus will likely remain an ally of Russia and part of its sphere of influence. Rather than focusing on breaking the Minsk-Moscow connection, as seen during Trump’s previous administration, efforts may now be geared towards containing Russian influence in the region.

Alexander Lukashenka initially symbolically supported Trump in his contest for the White House against Kamala Harris, hoping for improved bilateral relations after the power shift in Washington.

He quickly congratulated Trump on his victory, calling him a “powerhouse” and a “bulldozer,” and promised to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize if he could end the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Continuing his praise for the re-elected U.S. president, the Belarusian dictator expressed hope that Trump would not support Belarusian democratic forces (unlike his opponent, the 49th U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris) and would end the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Belarus.

In essence, Lukashenka outlined conditions for resuming dialogue with Washington—but on his own imagined terms, as before.

Lukashenka and his propaganda machinery generally view Trump neutrally or even positively, noting his fighting spirit and seeing in him an opponent of liberal democracy. His opponent, Harris, was perceived in Minsk as the embodiment of “Western globalism,” and there were concerns about continued support for Belarusian democratic forces in the spirit of Biden’s policy.

Furthermore, Lukashenka’s experience with the previous Trump administration was relatively positive. This included visits from National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Minsk. Their primary goal appeared to be testing the waters regarding Minsk’s genuine independence and its strategic autonomy from Russia, as well as convincing Belarus to scale back its relations with China.

However, given the current international climate, such diplomacy is unlikely, and any attempts to draw Lukashenka’s regime out of Russia’s embrace are doomed to fail. The Belarusian ruler himself shows no intention of moving closer to the U.S., aligning instead with Russia’s foreign policy course.

As a result, U.S. attitudes toward Belarus and potential easing or tightening of sanctions will likely depend on U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations. Criticism of Belarusian authorities over human rights violations will continue, though it may be softer and more formal.

Meanwhile, Belarusian democratic forces worry that support from the U.S. might wane after Trump’s victory. It is quite possible that Washington will shift the responsibility for supporting Belarusian democratic forces onto the European Union.

The new U.S. administration will probably not pursue a specific policy toward Belarus, viewing it as part of Russia’s sphere of influence and a junior partner to China.

If Trump focuses on enhancing dialogue with Russia to address geopolitical challenges (such as countering China’s influence), this could shift his administration’s approach from conflict to potential cooperation. In this scenario, Belarus, as a Russian ally, may temporarily be relieved from active U.S. pressure; however, it is unlikely to be seen by the U.S. as an independent player.

In any case, easing sanctions on the regime is unlikely without significant concessions from Lukashenka in the political and military-strategic spheres, which the regime is currently incapable of delivering.