Lukashenka’s Regime’s Role in Negotiations to End the War in Ukraine in Question

The Belarusian regime has once again expressed its desire to participate in peace negotiations aimed at resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, Minsk has yet to articulate how it could contribute to solving the issue. Further complicating this prospect is Lukashenko’s image as a co-aggressor and a puppet of Russia in the eyes of Ukraine and its allies. The Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State has further entrenched Belarus within Russia’s sphere of influence, while the Lukashenka’s regime has shown neither the will nor the capacity to make a positive contribution to regional security.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed extreme surprise at Belarus’s claim to a seat at the negotiating table after the war’s conclusion, alongside demands for security guarantees. Kyiv emphasized that Lukashenka’s regime became an accomplice to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, violating its own constitution.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Georgiy Tykhy stated that Belarusian officials are entitled only to fair trials for their complicity in aggression against Ukraine, not to participation in peace talks.

From Ukraine’s perspective, the primary threat to Belarus’s security is Russia, which used Belarusian territory as a launchpad for its aggression against Ukraine. Meanwhile, Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Ambrazevich’s calls for security guarantees ignore the country’s active role in the conflict.

Officially, Minsk claims that Belarus is uniquely interested in a swift peaceful resolution to the conflict, as no country wants military actions near its borders. Allegedly, this is why Belarus has taken peacekeeping steps to prevent escalation from the beginning.

The Belarusian Foreign Ministry insists that securing its own safety is crucial and that final agreements must consider Belarus’s interests. Yet, Minsk has not clarified what these interests entail. Previously, Lukashenka responded to one of the peace plan proposals from Donald Trump’s advisors by arguing that his participation was necessary to prevent unacceptable outcomes for Belarus, such as the loss of half of its territory. His concerns also appear to include his personal prospects. However, Minsk has made no concrete proposals to date.

Belarus’s participation in negotiations seems problematic at this stage for several reasons. Firstly, the regime voluntarily provided Belarusian territory and airspace for Russian forces to attack Ukraine. If Minsk had objected, it could have appealed to the UN, stating that Russia used Belarusian territory without formal consent and failed to withdraw its troops after the Union Resolve 2022 exercises, violating agreements. In such a scenario, Russia’s actions could have been declared aggression against Belarus, with Minsk notifying the UN. Instead, the regime supported the aggression militarily, politically, and ideologically.

Therefore, any participation by the regime in negotiations would likely align it with Russia—a redundant position from Moscow’s perspective, especially after signing the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the Union State. Moscow believes it has provided Belarus with all necessary security assurances for at least the next decade, including the stationing of military bases and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) for use against potential aggressors.

Hypothetically, Moscow could favor Belarus’s involvement in negotiations as an additional supportive voice if the dialogue occurs in an international format. However, the primary obstacle would be Ukraine and its partners, who view Belarus as a co-aggressor and a Russian puppet. For now, Moscow insists on direct bilateral talks with Kyiv, and Minsk seems eager to position itself as a host for such negotiations—a preference clearly more attractive to the Kremlin than any alternative location.

Belarus’s participation could become feasible if it added value to regional security through actions such as:

• Declaring neutrality with international security guarantees against the use of Belarusian territory by Russia for aggression against neighboring states;
• Removing Russian TNW or placing it under international control;
• Offering goodwill services, such as becoming a UN hub for addressing Ukraine’s humanitarian issues.

However, these hypothetical steps would require a complete break with Russia in the security sphere and Belarus’s exit from Russia’s sphere of influence. It is equally clear that the current regime lacks both the political will and the resources to undertake such actions.