Instrumentalization of History: The Victim Stance

The theme of the “genocide of the Belarusian people” (as a particular case of the “genocide of the Soviet people”) continues to gain momentum. Politicians, officials, lawyers, and historians in Belarus and Russia are exploiting the term “genocide” in any situation related to Nazi crimes against Soviet citizens. Moreover, they continue to paint new retrospectives of the Great Patriotic War. Why is this happening?

During the II Forum of the Union State “Russia and Belarus: Shared History, Shared Destiny,” which took place in Kaliningrad from October 2 to 4, the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus and the Russian Presidential Library signed cooperation agreements. Several similar agreements were also signed in parallel. The event’s goal was to promote the preservation of shared historical memory within the Union State and to give new impetus to countering falsifications of history and the outcomes of World War II.

Vadim Lakiza, Director of the Institute of History, stated during the forum that the commission investigating facts of genocide is uncovering new data in the so-called “Khatyn Lists.” Two and a half years ago, the number of settlements that shared Khatyn’s fate was 186; today, that number has reached 288. Along with facts about burned Belarusian villages, new details have been established regarding affected settlements. It was previously believed that there were 9,000 such villages in Belarus; now the figure has increased to 12,000.

Thus, the project is gaining momentum, and those involved seem to see great potential in it.

Initially, the concept of the “genocide of the Soviet people” emerged within the Putin administration and associated groups like the “Search Movement of Russia” and the “Historical Memory” foundation led by Alexander Dyukov. Since 2020, show trials about Nazi crimes have been held in various regions of Russia, consistently accompanied by the proper resonance in state media.

Minsk quickly supported the Kremlin’s initiative. In the spring of 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office launched a large-scale investigation into the genocide of the Belarusian people, allegedly committed during the occupation in the Great Patriotic War. Before the investigation began, a law on genocide was passed in Belarus, which introduced criminal liability for denying its occurrence during the war and the post-war period (up until December 31, 1951).

Why did the initiators of this “new line” of historical memory need all this? Formally, it is to work through the traumas of the past great war. In reality, it is to add to the image of “we are the main victors over Nazism” the additional narrative of “we are the main victims of Nazism” — victims who have not been fully avenged. From this new emphasis, the developers believe they can extract many symbolic (strictly speaking, political) benefits.

The general trend is as follows: the topic of the extermination of Jews should be marginalized and replaced with the broader concept of “genocide of the Soviet people” (with specific branches such as the genocide of the Belarusian or Russian people). The tragedy of the Jewish people is merely a particular case of a larger tragedy, and the Holocaust holds no fundamental significance. This is the first point.

Secondly, in one large crime, many smaller ones can be drowned out, and in a large genocide, numerous less significant ones can be obscured. The historical dust raised theoretically allows the crimes of the Stalinist regime to be blurred and pushed into the background: from the joint victory parade with Nazi Germany in Brest in 1939 to the actions of the NKVD in Belarus, Ukraine, and other Eastern European countries. All crimes were committed solely by “Nazis.”

Thirdly, the new “historical paradigm” can be used in current politics. After the start of the so-called Special Military Operation in Ukraine, absurd parallels began to be drawn: today’s war is a continuation of the “Great Patriotic War” being fought against the same “Nazis,” who are now entrenched in Ukraine, the Baltic states, and other hostile countries. Back then, we were threatened with the “genocide of the Soviet people”; today, it’s the “genocide of Russians and Belarusians.”

Fourthly, questions of historical memory can be used to increase hostility and distrust between neighboring countries and peoples (though the effectiveness of this approach is questionable). At the aforementioned forum, historians from Russia and Belarus proposed recognizing the Volyn Massacre as a “genocide of Poles” by Ukrainian nationalists. Earlier, in September, Alexander Dyukov, director of the “Historical Memory” foundation, stated that Polish authorities, especially since 2014, have been “sweeping under the rug” the memory of the Volyn Massacre.

It is easy to predict that the ideology of “genocide” will be highly exploited in the context of the presidential elections in Belarus and in the run-up to the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The level of repression will increase.