Foreign Policy Regression: Back to the Balancing Act?

Today, Minsk has nearly exhausted its foreign policy potential. It has little to offer—aside from increasing exports—to Russia, China, Western countries, or the “outer arc” nations. A return to the geopolitical balancing act is not just the most viable solution from Minsk’s perspective; it may be the only option left. As experience shows, the Kremlin is unlikely to counter the “slippery” maneuvers of the Belarusian dictator, who has become an expert in this type of political game.

Recently, Lukashenka stated that he is constantly receiving advice to step back from certain positions, release certain people (likely referring to political prisoners), and even switch sides in the war to support Ukraine. “Forget about Russia, turn away from it. Join the fight with Ukraine against Russia. We’ll even bring NATO troops to the Smolensk border,” he claims he is being told from all sides. However, the source of these suggestions remains unknown. Lukashenkabelieves that such proposals are 99% unacceptable.

Earlier, the Belarusian dictator had a sudden surge of goodwill towards Ukraine, congratulating his neighbors on Independence Day on August 24th. He wished the “brotherly people” a peaceful sky, civil harmony, national prosperity, and family unity. Additionally, on August 27th, Lukashenka congratulated the people of Moldova on their Independence Day, expressing Minsk’s readiness to resume cooperation with Chișinău.

At the same time, Lukashenka continues to reassure the Russian leadership that he will stand with them in the war against Ukraine and the confrontation with the West until the very end (see “No Step Back at 99%…”).

These radically contradictory statements and gestures are characteristic of the Belarusian leader’s style. He expects that various audiences will correctly interpret the signals he is sending. In the language of Minsk diplomacy, these signals and gestures likely indicate that Lukashenka intends to enter a new phase of “integration,” meaning bargaining with Moscow under the current conditions.

What are these current conditions? They largely boil down to two points: (1) You promised us a quick victory in Ukraine—but that hasn’t happened. (2) You promised us rapid integration—but that hasn’t happened either. There are no “brotherly” energy prices, and the import-substitution loan (according to insiders) has been significantly cut in favor of Russian contractors.

In short, there has been no progress. And where there is no progress, it’s natural, in psychoanalytic terms, to see a regressive dynamic in the subject—in this case, a return to previous, tried-and-true forms of adaptation. For the Belarusian leadership, this means a desire to return to the situation before 2020, when the policy of oscillating between East and West was working quite well. That would be the ideal scenario. The minimalist version of such a plan would involve creating at least the illusion that the geopolitical balancing act is back in play. This would create the familiar conditions for Lukashenka’s re-election in 2025—conditions of mild or limited pressure on Minsk from both the West and Russia.

“The country is living through a very difficult period, a moment of ‘either-or,'” says Lukashenka. He would like to return to the good old days of nuance and ambiguity.