Digital Geopolitics: Creating Our Own “National” Stack

The Belarusian authorities aim to dominate the national segment of the global network. By “national,” they now mean the allied information space, which involves overlaying digital contours over the physical borders of states. In practice, this policy of Minsk means voluntarily joining the Russian stack, which is far from being in an advanced stage of formation.

On July 10 in Moscow, representatives from Belarus and Russia discussed the current issues related to point 8 (“Common Information Space of the Union State”) of the main directions for implementing the provisions of the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State for 2024-2026. Two days later, Belarusian Information Minister Marat Markov summarized the outcome.

According to Markov, Belarus and Russia face two interrelated tasks. The first is to dominate their own (i.e., the allied) information space. The second is that to dominate, it is necessary to develop their social networks and internet services, thereby eliminating dependence on Western products that have been imposed on Belarusians for many years. Markov proposes replacing YouTube, Telegram, TikTok, Instagram, and other social networks and platforms with “homegrown” tools.

Thus, the Minister of Information reiterated the long-held dream of the Belarusian ruling class: to ensure the country’s online independence through the creation of its own “stack” – a term borrowed by political scientists from Silicon Valley. The dream was initially unrealistic and therefore unfulfilled. But with current adjustments (since it now concerns not a national but an allied information space), it looks more viable and realistic.

In IT language, a “stack” is the sum of all technologies and services on which a specific application relies, from the microchip to the operating system and network. In politics, it means almost the same thing, but at the state level. A national stack is a sovereign digital space that includes not only software and hardware but also the infrastructure for payments, online identification, and control of information flows.

In terms of digital import substitution, Russia has succeeded more than Belarus – for example, Minsk neither created nor even proposed an alternative to the closed internet portal TUT.by. Vladimir Putin, who considers the worldwide network a “CIA project” and sees enemies everywhere, has always attached great importance to this issue, especially since 2014.

After the war in Ukraine began, Putin’s regime, with prescribed hardware for internet providers, blocked the Tor router, which many use for anonymity. The activities of Instagram and Facebook, owned by Meta Platforms Inc., are recognized as extremist and banned in Russia (though they can still be used with some restrictions). Moreover, the VK media holding continues to successfully promote its own products. There is also RuTube, the national equivalent of YouTube.

For an autocrat of Putin’s caliber, the most inspiring example is China’s “Golden Shield” – an aggregator that blocks users’ access to certain sites and reduces the speed of VPN services to zero, making them ineffective. Experts, however, note that Russia should have adopted this example much earlier, as it is now doomed to permanent lag (considering that Chinese information technology is estimated by specialists to be 5-10 years behind the latest wave).

The most vulnerable part of the Russian stack is at the hardware level – at the component base level. Chip manufacturers worldwide using American technologies for development or production must obtain an export license from the US Department of Commerce in Washington. Therefore, the issue of sanctions is quite acute here. Ultimately, Russia may fall into dependence on Chinese equipment and software, which even its own authorities fear.

Belarus, in turn, finds itself in double dependence – on the Russian digital environment in general and on information content in particular. Instead of this clear double dependence, it would have been better to prefer the previous, distributed one, but Belarusian authorities are not currently considering this much. It’s hard to imagine a more toxic information environment than the Belarusian one, but the Russian one is exactly that.

It is assumed that the Union State media holding will eliminate the disparity of Belarusian media presence in Russia, but how this will be implemented is probably unknown even to the project initiators. The intensifying “disputes” between pro-government bloggers and propagandists indicate that the issue of dividing the national digital space will be quite acute in the near future.

Thus, the absurdity in the network will strengthen, and Belarus’s information security policy will be built approximately as follows: we close multiple external vulnerabilities, reducing them to a black hole of dependence.