A Nuclear Power Plant Could Break Down. So, Why Not Build a Spare?
Minsk continues to push the idea of constructing a second nuclear power plant (NPP) in Belarus with increasing persistence. Lukashenko announced that he plans to discuss this issue with Putin, believing such a conversation would be appropriate in the context of forming a unified electricity market within the Union State. Experts, however, remain skeptical about the prospects of this new mega-project—some even consider it yet another economic gamble.
The initiative to build a new NPP is still far from being well thought out, but Lukashenka already claims to know where to find funding for it. He proposed using the remaining portion of the loan provided by Moscow for the Belarusian NPP: USD 5.36 billion out of 10 billion has been spent. Lukashenka calculated that the remaining funds would be enough to build two additional power units. In reality, the total cost of the Belarusian NPP is estimated at nearly USD 7 billion—excluding expenses for building the roads and railways leading to the station.
A report on the construction of a second NPP is expected to be presented to the government and the president in 2025. A representative of the Ministry of Energy stated that the work on the feasibility study is nearing completion.
The launch of the Belarusian NPP marked the beginning of the nuclear era for Belarus, but the promised era of cheap electricity never arrived.
According to iSANS experts, from an economic perspective, the first NPP will remain unprofitable for 15 years—until the loan is paid off. The situation with the second NPP is likely to be even worse. It will primarily benefit those involved in its construction or responsible for procuring equipment. While investments in the project may temporarily boost economic growth indicators, the benefits effectively end there.
If electricity is supplied exclusively to the domestic market, operating the new NPP will be virtually impossible—even considering projected increases in energy consumption over the next 5–10 years. Unlike firewood or liquefied gas, electricity cannot be stored or accumulated: everything generated must be consumed. The possibility of exporting electricity to the Baltic states is already blocked, not only for political reasons but also for technical ones. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are fully prepared to disconnect from the BRELL energy grid and connect to Western Europe’s power networks in early February.
The Russian government is also unenthusiastic about the idea of a new player entering its national electricity market. Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Pavel Snikkars expressed “cautious and restrained” views on Belarus’s initiative to build a second NPP: “We need to understand who will consume this energy. There’s no goal to simply build something for it to stand idle.” In short, there is no economic rationale for purchasing Belarusian electricity.
Lukashenka, however, seems to view the situation from a broader perspective (at least not in terms of economic losses) and likely hopes to secure a political decision from Putin to purchase Belarusian electricity at a loss to the Russian energy system. Why not? Aren’t we building a “unified” energy market?
Meanwhile, the Belarusian NPP has not been generating electricity for more than a month and a half. The first power unit is undergoing scheduled maintenance, while the second has been disconnected from the grid due to a malfunction (likely linked to construction defects). On the eve of the presidential election, one power unit was urgently launched to demonstrate the station’s functionality.
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Situation in Belarus