2024: Life Behind the “Iron Curtain”. 2025: A Game of Monopoly or the Path of Dependence

In 2024, the integration of Belarus and Russia slowed somewhat. Officials increasingly rarely mentioned the transformation of the “Union State” into something structured, cohesive, and organic. Moscow did not provide new loans for import substitution. The two countries never began creating a truly unified energy market… This does not mean that Russia’s soft incorporation of Belarus has been halted—quite the opposite. In most strategic areas, the Lukashenka regime has found itself critically dependent on its more powerful (and only!) foreign policy partner. The Kremlin has never been closer to taking over the key functions of the Belarusian state—the monopoly on force and control over information.

The year 2024 was not “breakthrough” in terms of forming and strengthening the Union State (US), which—since the signing of the 1999 treaty—remains a “paper state.” There are no supranational institutions, no legal framework, no unified nationwide infrastructure, no single ideology, or anything else that would testify to the existence of the US as such. Yes, there are several Union programs, about which little is known except for propagandistic announcements like: “Union electric cars, space exploration, IT: what breakthrough projects could Belarus and Russia achieve?” If there had been even somewhat significant results in terms of import substitution, propaganda would certainly have announced them.

Thus, there are no signs indicating genuine Union construction. Rather, it appears to be a “restorative” rebuilding of small post-Soviet tyrannies. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is attempting a soft political takeover in Belarus, avoiding the mistakes made earlier in the Baltic states, Georgia, and Ukraine. The “Union State” is a cynical pretext for both sides to act strictly in their own interests. The Lukashenka regime finds itself in an increasingly humiliating and losing dependency on its more powerful and, unfortunately, sole foreign policy partner.

Mutual trade turnover continues to show growth. Compared to 2023, the increase may reach 6%, given that a clear upward trend has been visible since 2021 (see chart). Economists always warn: growth can be a harbinger of future decline. For Belarus, an increase in trade turnover with Russia without comparable indicators from other “friendly” countries is equivalent to losing independence in key areas—economy as a whole, production, and finance. As experts note, before 2020, a significant portion of exports went to other markets. In particular, there was the infamous diversification formula—30/30/30 (Europe, Russia, and the rest of the world)—that Belarus ostensibly aimed for. Now, supplies to the Russian market account for 70% by value. The Belarusian regime’s optimism about growing trade with Russia is also overshadowed by a rising trade deficit and trade wars involving various goods, with the direct participation of Belarusian Gosstandart, Russian Rosselkhoznadzor, and lobbyists representing producers from both countries in one form or another.

Since almost all raw material exports come from Russia, traditional energy dependence remains a key issue. Once again, Belarusian efforts to quickly launch a joint gas, oil, and petroleum market with Russia have failed. The key question remains the price of gas. Belarus seeks a price equal to Russia’s domestic rates, targeting the Smolensk region—about $70 per 1,000 cubic meters (compared to $128.5 per 1,000 cubic meters for Belarus). The Kremlin counters that gas deliveries to this region are subsidized from the Russian budget, which is unrealistic for Belarus, a friendly but independent state, given the current level of integration. The only progress in the Union energy sector, which includes two major components—oil and gas, and electricity—was the signing of an interstate agreement on the phased formation of a unified electricity market. The first phase will begin in 2025, with the approval of its operating rules.

Western sanctions against the Lukashenka regime have been effective (though perhaps not as originally intended), and trade-economic dependence on Russia is being reinforced by transport-logistics dependency, which did not exist previously. The Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine are no longer export hubs for Belarus. There is only Russia, with its vast spaces and primarily potential seaport terminals. Putin and Lukashenka have discussed the issue of “Belarusian” port capacities in northwest Russia and the Far East multiple times, and there may be progress—but not as significant as Minsk officials envision. Currently, Belarusian exports cannot generate enough to cover the construction costs of future “Belarusian” seaports in Russia.

In 2024, Minsk and Moscow made notable efforts to build an informational iron curtain. In the resulting informational universe, Russian content dominates absolutely. Over the year, both sides repeatedly addressed the issue of forming a national (Union?) “stack”—a sovereign digital space that includes software, hardware, and infrastructure for online identification, payments, and control of information flows. Additionally, it would enable effective conduct of an “information war.” In November, a Union State media company was established—an aggregator of news about events in the two countries. It is expected to launch in 2025.

Amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the allies increasingly used historical memory issues for propaganda purposes (e.g., the narrative of the “genocide of the Belarusian people” as part of the “genocide of the Soviet people”). In terms of weaponizing history, Russia has been more successful. While there are no fundamental disagreements between the two sides over post-war history, there are significant differences regarding earlier periods. As a result, Russian court historians want to rewrite Belarusian early, pre-war, and pre-revolutionary history to fit their own narrative.

The greatest progress has been in forming a unified defense space—in the strict sense, assembling an anti-Western military bloc with Russia playing an absolutely dominant role. Essentially, this involves the Belarusian ruling class ceding one of the state’s most critical functions: the monopoly on violence.

Forecasts:
• Given Belarus’s growing dependency on Russia in most areas of cooperation (security, trade-economic relations, logistics, finance, investments, etc.), a certain reversal is possible, which could be called a new stage of the “game for independence.” This may occur if Lukashenko successfully “wins reelection” for another presidential term, which he will personally perceive as resetting previous commitments.

• Gradual slowing of mutual trade growth as it reaches its “technical” limits—production, resource, technological, financial, and transport-logistics constraints.

• Trade wars are inevitable and necessary. The principle of competition has not been canceled.

• Amid the establishment of rules for the common electricity market, an “energy crisis” similar to the Belarus-Russia energy disputes of 2006/2007, 2010, and 2017 is likely due to delays in forming a common oil and gas market.

• Continued cultural intervention—strengthening the influence of Russian propaganda and the ideology of the “Russian world” in Belarus’s information space.