Belarus may address collection agencies to reduce foreign accounts receivable
The situation has not changed
As of August 1st, foreign overdue receivables to Belarusian companies by Russian contractors totalled USD 305 million – a 28% increase since early 2015 – mainly due to the deterioration in the financial health of Russian companies. In the manufacturing industry the number of insolvent companies has increased by 60%. In the future, the state may tighten liability for breach of terms of currency revenue assurance and companies may increase the usage of financial services, such as factoring and reduce grey schemes, such as quasi-exports. If Belarusian companies are unable to recover debts, the state may allow them to request vindication services.
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Once a week, in coordination with a group of prominent Belarusian analysts, we provide analytical commentaries on the most topical and relevant issues, including the behind-the-scenes processes occurring in Belarus. These commentaries are available in Belarusian, Russian, and English.
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