Модернизация Нафтана будет обеспечена российскими кредитами
The situation has not changed
21 мая первый вице-премьер правительства Беларуси В. Семашко сообщил о наличии принципиального согласия по выделению Сбербанком России USD 2 млрд. для строительства нефтехимического комплекса на базе Нафтана.
В случае реализации данного проекта ожидается увеличение объемов переработки нефти Нафтаном на 6-7 млн. тонн, улучшение экономики производства параксилола, отказ от импорта данной продукции, гарантированные поставки необходимого объема продуктов нефтепереработки для нужд отечественных предприятий химической промышленности. Белорусское правительство не скрывает заинтересованности в заключении дополнительных кредитных соглашений с российскими банками с целью модернизации белорусской промышленности.
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Once a week, in coordination with a group of prominent Belarusian analysts, we provide analytical commentaries on the most topical and relevant issues, including the behind-the-scenes processes occurring in Belarus. These commentaries are available in Belarusian, Russian, and English.
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Situation in Belarus
December 16 – December 22
Constitutional referendum: main consequences
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Speakers: Anatoliy Lebedko, Andrei Kazakevich
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How to count the political prisoners: are the new criteria needed?
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Speakers: Aleh Hulak, Aleh Aheyeu, Viachaslau Kasinierau
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Paternalism In Decline, Belarusian Euroscepticism, And The Influence Of Russia
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Digital Financial Assets: Bypassing Traditional Payment Systems?
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State Standards of Belarus vs Rosselkhoznadzor: Common Goals, Different Standards
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Unified Defense Space Almost Established, Unified Energy Market Still Absent
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Episodes of “Black November”: The Trump Factor, Sanctions, and Liquid Currency
November 25 – December 1
Lukashenka’s Regime’s Role in Negotiations to End the War in Ukraine in Question
December 16 – December 22
EU Imposes New Sanctions on Belarus Despite Calls from Democratic Forces for a Differentiated Strategy
December 9 – December 15
Strategic Dialogue with the USA: Attempt to Keep Washington’s Focus on Belarus
December 2 – December 8
The Belarusian Issue Ahead of the Leadership Change in the EU
November 25 – December 1
Putin Reminded of the Nuclear Umbrella over Belarus, While Lukashenka Mentioned Nuclear Weapons
December 16 – December 22
Kremlin to Share the “Oreshnik” Missile System with Lukashenko’s Regime to Expose Belarus to Potential NATO Retaliation
December 9 – December 15
Russia Solidifies Belarus in Its Sphere of Influence and Prepares for Conflict with Ukraine and the West
December 2 – December 8
Lukashenka’s Regime Contributed to the Creation of the “Oreshnik” and Seeks to Deploy It in Belarus
November 25 – December 1
New Challenges to Tsikhanouskaya’s Leadership
December 16 – December 22
Dilution of the Democratic Forces’ Agenda: Isolation or De-escalation?
December 9 – December 15
Democratic Forces: Navigating the “Elections” Without Losses
December 2 – December 8
Tsikhanouskaya’s Office: Consolidation and Protection of Activists
November 25 – December 1
National Unity Before Elections: The Paper Tiger of Support
December 16 – December 22
The Conveyor Belt of Re-education of Dissenters: New Prison Spaces at the Expense of Amnesty
December 9 – December 15
Deferred Transition of the Lukashenka Family
December 2 – December 8
Lukashenka’s Regime: Navigating Elections Ahead of a Crisis
November 25 – December 1